Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: the Case of the UK Auction by Tilman Boergers & Christian Dustmann
A joint Initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität and Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Working Papers
March 2002
Category 9: Industrial Organisation
Presented at CESifo Conference on Spectrum Auctions and Competition in
Telecommunication, November 2001
CESifo
Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany




An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de
* The authors are grateful to Paul Klemperer, Pedro Rey, and Klaus Schmidt for comments. This paper was written
while Tilman Boergers was visiting the Center for Economic Studies in Munich and Christian Dustmann was visiting
the Center for Labor Economics in Berkeley. Both authors thank their respective host institutions for generous
hospitality. Tilman Boergers’ research was also supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
through the Center for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE). Tilman Boergers was a member of a group
of economists who advised the United Kingdom’s Radiocommunications Agency on the design of the auction which
is discussed in this paper. This paper is based on publicly available information only. No use is made of confidential
information which was acquired while advising the Radiocommunications Agency. All opinions expressed in this
paper are those of the authors alone.
RATIONALIZING THE UMTS




CESifo Working Paper No. 679 (9)CESifo Working Paper No. 679
March 2002
RATIONALIZING THE UMTS SPECTRUM BIDS:
THE CASE OF THE UK AUCTION
Abstract
This paper considers bidder behaviour in the United Kingdom’s UMTS
spectrum auction. Evidence is reviewed which shows that some bidders in
this auction did not bid straightforwardly in accordance with fixed valuations
of the licenses. We go on to consider more speculative hypotheses about
bidders’ behaviour, such as the hypotheses that bidders revised their
valuations in the light of other bidders’ behaviour, or that bidders’ valuations
of licenses depended on which other companies appeared likely to win a
license. We find weak evidence in favor of some of these hypotheses, but no
hypothesis is supported by strong direct evidence. We conclude that the
rationalization of bidding in the United Kingdom’s UMTS auction remains
problematic. As a consequence we are cautious regarding the success of the














United Kingdom1I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the years 2000 and 2001 most European countries have awarded licenses to
mobile telephone companies which allow these companies to use radio spectrum for
the operation of third generation mobile telephone services (UMTS licenses). The
methods adopted for the award of these licenses have diﬀered widely across European
countries. Some countries such as Finland and Spain have bureaucratically decided
how many licenses there should be, of which size in terms of available radio spectrum
these licenses should be, and which companies should own them. Other countries
such as Germany and Austria have used auction type procedures to determine the
number and size of licenses as well as the license holders. Finally, some countries such
a st h eU n i t e dK i n g d o ma n dt h eN e t h e r l a n d sh a v ec h o s e na ni n t e r m e d i a t ep r o c e d u r e
where the number and size of licenses was determined by bureaucratic methods, but
the allocation of these licenses to ﬁrms was determined in an auction.
The outcomes of the licensing process have also diﬀered widely across European
countries. Finland and Spain, for example, have issued four UMTS licenses, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands have issued ﬁve UMTS licenses, and Germany
and Austria have issued six such licenses. In Finland licenses were essentially given
away for free. In Spain the total payments to the government by license holders per
head of the population were only 12 Euros. In Austria all successful bidders together
paid approximately 103 Euros per head of the population. In the Netherlands license
holders paid approximately 169 Euros per head of the population to the government.
But in Germany winning bidders paid 619 Euros and in the United Kingdom they
paid 642 Euros per head of the population.1
The large payments in the United Kingdom and Germany have attracted much
attention. The question arises whether the bids which companies made in the auc-
tions conducted by these two countries were based on careful business plans, or
whether they were the result of some form of “bidding fever”. A policy reason for
being interested in this question is that the purpose of these auctions, as stated
by the United Kingdom and Germany, was to allocate spectrum eﬃciently.2 How
exactly eﬃciency is to be understood in this context is not obvious, but a necessary
condition for eﬃciency is presumably that bidders rationally consider the value of
licenses, and that these valuations are expressed consistently in their bids. If this
was not the case in the UK or in Germany, then one can reasonably entertain doubts
w h e t h e ra ne ﬃcient allocation was achieved.
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the auction bids for UMTS li-
censes can be interpreted as rational bids which are based on careful valuations of
the licenses. We shall focus on the United Kingdom’s UMTS auction.3 We build
on earlier work of ours (Börgers and Dustmann (2001)) in which we have provided
evidence of signiﬁcant inconsistencies in bidders’ behaviour in the UK auction. Be-
1The information about the number of licenses and the payments made was obtained from the
following websites: www.itu.int (Finland and Spain), www.tkc.at (Austria), www.regtp.de (Ger-
many), www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk (UK), and www.wapworld.nl (Netherlands). Currency rates
were obtained from www.oanda.com, and population statistics from www.oecd.org.
2In the UK Telecommunications Minister Barbara Roche emphasized eﬃciency as the main goal
of the auction in a statement to the House of Commons on 18 May 1998. In Germany § 44 of the
Telekommunikationsgesetz, i.e. the law which governs spectrum allocation, states that eﬃciency
and absence of technical interference are the main goals of spectrum allocation.
3An analysis of Germany’s auction is for two reasons harder: ﬁrstly, the auction rules in Germany
were more complicated than in the UK, and secondly, unlike the UK, Germany did not publish all
of the bids made in the auction, but only some.
1fore explaining the contribution of the current paper it is worthwhile to review some
details of the UK auction, and to explain the main argument of our earlier paper.
The United Kingdom’s UMTS auction was a simultaneous ascending auction.4
Five non-identical licenses were for sale. The auction was organised in rounds.
In each round the currently leading bidder for each license could not change its
bid. All bidders who were not currently leading on some license had to either
overbid the currently leading bid for one license, or they had to withdraw from
the auction. To overbid a leading bid one had to raise that bid by a minimum
percentage. Withdrawal was irreversible. The auction closed once bidding on all
licenses had stopped. The currently leading bidders were then awarded the licenses,
and had to pay their last bids.
All bids in the United Kingdom’s auction, including bids which were not the
highest bids, were instantaneously published on the internet.5 I no u re a r l i e rp a p e r
(Börgers and Dustmann (2001)) we have analysed these bidding data. Our work
was based on a naive theory of what it would mean to bid on the basis of rational
valuations of the licenses. This was the theory of private values and straightforward
bidding. According to this theory bidders enter the auction with ﬁxed valuations
for each license, and do not revise these valuations during the auction. This is the
“private values” part of the theory. The “straightforward bidding” part says that
ﬁrms bid in each round for the license for which the diﬀerence between the value
of the license and the minimum bid that is admissible for that license is largest,
provided that this diﬀerence is positive. Moreover, bidders only place minimal ad-
missible bids. Once the minimum bid for all licenses is larger than their value the
ﬁrm withdraws.6
In the earlier paper we presented clear evidence which refutes this naive theory of
bidding for the UK auction. The most important deviation from the theory concerns
the bidders’ revealed value diﬀerences. Under the theory of private values and
straightforward bidding the bids placed in the auction contain important information
about these diﬀerences. To explain this we give a simple example. Suppose that
only two licenses are for sale, A and B, and that in a certain round the smallest
admissible bid for A is £10 more than the smallest admissible bid for B.C o n s i d e ra
bidder who chooses to bid for A. Then this bid reveals that this bidder’s value of A is
at least £10 larger than his value for B. Now every bidder typically has to bid many
times throughout the auction, and each new bid reveals further information about
the valuation diﬀerences. For example, if the same bidder bids later for B when
the price diﬀerence is £12 then we have not only a lower (£10) but also an upper
bound (£12) for the diﬀerence of the values of A and B. But now suppose that the
same bidder bids in an even later round for B when the price diﬀerence is only £8.
Then we have an inconsistency. This bidder’s behaviour does not seem to reveal a
consistent view of what the value diﬀerence is.
The evidence against straightforward bidding with private values which we pro-
4The following account of the rules of the UK auction is very brief, and leaves out many important
details. A more complete account of the rules of the auction is in Section 2 below.
5At the time at which this paper was written this information was publicly available on the
internet at: http://www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk/auction/auction_index.htm.
6This theory of bidding in simultaneous ascending auctions is studied in one of the fundamental
theoretical papers on simultaneous ascending auctions (Milgrom (2000)). If bidders hold private
values then straightforward bidding is rational (see Appendix 1 of Börgers and Dustmann (2001))
and it implies eﬃciency of the outcome of the auction (see Appendix 2 of Börgers and Dustmann
(2001)).
2vide in Börgers and Dustmann (2001) shows that bidding in the UK’s spectrum
auction was aﬀected by inconsistencies of exactly the type which we have just de-
scribed. The inconsistencies concerned the revealed diﬀerence between the value of
a “large” (in terms of spectrum) license and the value of a “small” license. Several
important bidders’ behaviour does not reveal any consistent estimate of this value
diﬀerence. In fact, for most of these bidders their estimate of the diﬀerence seems
to have increased dramatically during the auction, in one case even by a factor of
six. Thus our earlier paper rejects straightforward bidding with private values for
the UK auction.
We now come to the contribution of the current paper. It is based on the
observation that the ﬁnding of the earlier paper does not necessarily imply that
the companies which bid in the UK auction did not have careful valuations of the
UMTS licenses, or that their bidding strategies were irrational. Straightforward
bidding with private values is a very narrow interpretation of the general intuitive
idea of “rational bidding that is based on a careful valuation of the licenses”. Wider
interpretations might allow, for example, for valuations which change during the
auction. One possible rationale for this would be that a “common value” element
was present in the auction. As a consequence companies may have learned from
observing other companies’ bidding behaviour during the auction about the license
values. The learning might have lead to a change in their valuations which to
a naive observer looks like an inconsistency. Another possibility is that allocative
externalities may have been present. Such externalities exist if companies’ valuations
of licenses depend on which other companies win a license. Companies beliefs about
the likely winners of other licenses might have changed during the auction, and this
may have lead to apparent inconsistencies. The purpose of the current paper is
to provide a more detailed assessment of the hypothesis that behaviour in the UK
auction was consistent with “rational bidding that is based on a careful valuation
of licenses” provided that a suﬃciently wide interpretation of this intuitive idea is
adopted.
Because companies’ behaviour in the UK auction diﬀered a lot, we focus on
case studies of individual companies. We select three companies which played a
particularly important role in the auction, and for which we found in our earlier
p a p e ri n c o n s i s t e n c i e si nt h e i re v a l u a t i o no ft h ed i ﬀerence between licenses. These
three companies are: BT3G, TIW and NTL Mobile. BT3G and TIW both won a
license in the UK auction. NTL Mobile was the last company to drop out of the UK
auction.
The three companies which we have selected for this paper were, together with
Vodafone, the most persistent bidders for the two large licenses which the UK gov-
ernment put up for sale. As Vodafone’s behaviour is very easily understood7 one
can thus also say that our paper provides a detailed analysis of the bidding races for
the two large licenses.
We begin by providing detailed round by round descriptions of these companies’
bidding behaviour. In this context we also recapitulate our earlier ﬁnding that
these companies’ bidding is inconsistent with the theory of straightforward bidding
with private values. We then discuss the extent to which alternative hypotheses
can explain the available evidence. Our main ﬁnding is that there is no hypothesis
for which we can provide strong evidence from our data. However, there are some
7See our comments in Section 4.
3hypotheses which seem plausible, and which, if true, would not necessarily leave a
lot of “footprints” in our data.
An example of a hypothesis for which we might hope to ﬁnd strong evidence in
our data is the hypothesis that allocative externalities were present. Suppose that we
maintain the myopia hypothesis implicit in the theory of straightforward bidding,
and postulate that companies bid in each round for that license which currently
oﬀers the best value, assuming that the leaders on all other licenses will not change.
Then we should ﬁnd that companies reveal consistent valuation diﬀerences once we
condition on the current leaders on other licenses. In this paper we give evidence
that this was not the case in the UK auction.
An example of a hypothesis which does not leave a lot of footprints in our data is
that companies learned from other companies’ bids about the true value of licenses.
Which precise form such learning takes depends on a companies’ prior beliefs about
the value of licenses, about the information available to other bidders, and about the
strategies adopted by other bidders. Depending on how these beliefs are speciﬁed
relatively arbitrary belief paths can be obtained, and consequently it is diﬃcult to
tell from observed bidding behaviour whether this form of learning played a role
or not. We shall have to rely on plausibility considerations. In some cases, these
considerations lead us to conclude that social learning of the type described here
m a yw e l lh a v ep l a y e dar o l e .
We cannot reach an unambiguous answer regarding the question whether the
UK bids can be explained as rational bids based on careful valuations of the UMTS
licenses for sale. However, the current paper reinforces the main message of our
earlier paper, namely that the UK experience provides some reason for caution.
Bidders’ behaviour in the UK auction remains ill understood. It is unclear whether
this auction achieved its eﬃciency objective. For policy questions an important
further question is, of course, whether better alternative allocation methods exist.
Our paper has nothing to say about this question.
We conclude this introduction with a brief discussion of related literature. This
is important because our argument that the UK bidding data raise important open
questions runs counter to the interpretation of these data by other authors. Plott
and Salmon (2001) have used the UK data to estimate diﬀerent companies’ license
valuations, and have then determined the percentage of bids which are in accordance
with these estimates and straightforward bidding. The percentages which they ﬁnd
vary substantially from company to company, but overall they conclude that the
theory of private values and straightforward bidding does well. We come to a more
negative conclusion than they do because we regard the percentages of unexplained
bids as more important than Plott and Salmon do. Indeed, an easy calculation
shows that if the private values which Plott and Salmon estimate were correct, then
s o m eo ft h eb i d sw h i c ht h e i ra p p r o a c hl e a v e su n e x p l a i n e dw o u l dh a v ec a u s e dl o s s e s
between one and two billion Pounds, had they been successful.
Plott and Salmon also investigate the extent to which estimates based on the
ﬁrst 75 or 100 rounds allow an outside observer to predict the ﬁnal licence winner
and the price which they will pay. They ﬁnd that these predictions are reasonably
accurate. Our investigations show that any eﬀorts to predict on the basis of the
ﬁrst 75 or 100 rounds not just the ﬁnal winners, but also the bids placed in the
intervening rounds (101 to 150) would lead to very inaccurate forecasts for some
companies.
The UK auction data have also been examined by Peter Cramton in his report
4for the National Audit Oﬃce (Cramton (2001)). Cramton writes that “Most of the
bidders pursued a strategy of bidding on the license that represented the best value.
Bidders thus switched from license to license as the prices changed. ... The pricing
dynamics were predictable, although certainly not the absolute values of prices”
(Cramton (2001, p.50)). Cramton’s report does not include a detailed discussion of
empirical evidence. We argue that if one adopts the interpretations of the phrase
“bidding for best value” described in this paper, or in our previous paper, then the
evidence that bidders bid for best value is not very strong.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
background to the United Kingdom’s auction and provide some summary informa-
tion about the outcome of the auction. To illustrate our benchmark of private values
and straightforward bidding we discuss in Section 3 the bids made by Orange. These
bids were largely in line with our benchmark hypotheses. Section 4 then considers
in more detail the behaviour of BT3G. Section 5 conducts a similar case study for
TIW and NTL Mobile. Section 6 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d 8
The sale of UMTS licences in the United Kingdom was conducted by the “Radio-
communications Agency”. This is an agency of the UK’s government. The Radio-
communications Agency sold ﬁve licences, labeled A, B, C, D and E. Each licence
entitles its owner to the use of a part of the spectrum that is identiﬁed in the li-
cence. Licence A consists of 15+15 MHz of paired spectrum and 5 MHz of unpaired
spectrum.9 Licence B consists of 15+15 MHz of paired spectrum. Licences C, D
a n dEc o n s i s to f1 0 + 1 0M H zo fp a i r e ds p e c t r u ma n d5M H zo fu n p a i r e ds p e c t r u m .
The licences remain in force until 2021. At the time of the auction licences could
not be traded, but the government indicated that it might enable licence trading
during the duration of the licences. The licences came with an obligation to roll
out a network covering at least 80% of the UK population by 2007. Licence A was
reserved for a new entrant into the UK’s mobile phone market. The incumbent
four mobile telephone operators were not allowed to bid for license A. The four
incumbent mobile telephone operators in the United Kingdom were at the time of
the auction: Vodafone, Cellnet (owned by British Telecom), Orange, and One2One.
Their mobile telephone subscriber shares in the UK were on 1 May 1999: Vodafone
(37.3%), Cellnet (30.1%), Orange (17.2%) and One2One (15.4%).
The auction was organized in “rounds”. In each round, except the ﬁrst round,
each licence had a “current price” and a “current price bidder”. In each round the
current price bidders had to remain inactive. All other bidders had three actions
available to them. (1) They could make a bid for one of the licences. This bid had
to exceed the “current price” by a minimum increment that was announced by the
Radiocommunications Agency before the round began. (2) They could ask for a
“waiver”, i.e. do nothing. Each bidder could ask for a total of three waivers only in
the auction. (3) They could withdraw from the auction. Withdrawal was ﬁnal: a
8This section reviews some material that we originally presented in Börgers and Dustmann
(2001). For a detailed account of the discussions which preceded the UK auction and of the role of
academic economists in these discussions see Binmore and Klemperer (2002).
9Paired spectrum is important for two way traﬃc on mobile telephone systems, such as conver-
sations. Unpaired spectrum can be useful if the main focus is one way traﬃc, as is the case when
internet pages are downloaded on a mobile telephone.
5bidder who withdrew could not re-enter the auction.
The highest bid for each licence became the “current price” in the next round,
and the bidder who placed that bid became the “current price bidder” in the next
round. If no bid was placed on a licence then the “current price” and the “current
price bidder” remained unchanged. If several bidders placed identical highest bids on
a licence then the “current price bidder” was randomly selected from these bidders.
The auction ended when the last bidder who was not “current price bidder” for some
licence had withdrawn. Each “current price bidder” was then awarded its licence at
the “current price”.
The minimum bids for the ﬁve licences in the ﬁrst round were: A (£125 million)
B (£107.1 Million.), C, D and E (£89.3 Million). In the ﬁrst round all bidders had
to be active and had to choose one of the three actions described above. In later
rounds the minimum increment was x% of the current price, where x was initially
5, and was later chosen by the Radiocommunications Agency.
Interested bidders had to pay an initial deposit of £50 million. A bidder who
wished to increase his bid to £400 million had to pay an additional deposit of
£50 million. Winning bidders could choose between either paying immediately or
deferring part of the payment, where then an interest rate would be applied.
All four incumbents entered the auction. Cellnet participated in the auction
as BT3G. In addition, nine outsiders joined the auction: NTL Mobile, 3G UK,
Worldcom, TIW, Telefonica, Spectrumco, Crescent, One.Tel, and Epsilon. The
government agreed to regard these companies as independent bidders. Orange was
owned by Mannesmann who, in turn, had just been taken over by Vodafone, but
Vodafone gave an undertaking to the government to dispose of Orange after the
auction, and to take measures which ensured the independence of Orange’s bidding
in the auction.
The auction opened on 6 March 2000 and closed on 27 April 2000. The number
of rounds was 150. The typical number of rounds per day was ﬁve. The minimum
increments by which a bidder had to overbid the previously highest bid was initially
5% but was lowered in several steps to 1.5%.
The ﬁrst company withdrew in round 94. All withdrawal decisions are listed
in Table 2. The ﬁnal winners of the auction, and the winning bids, are listed in
Table 1.
Licence Company Winning Bid
A TIW £4,384.7 million
B Vodafone £5,964.0 million
C BT3G £4,030.1 million
D One2One £4,003.6 million
E Orange £4,095,0 million
Table 1: Winners










All companies which won licences opted to pay for these licences immediately
although the government had oﬀered an option of deferred payment. By September
2000 all licences had been issued.
Table 2 shows that the ﬁrst ﬁve bidders to withdraw from the auction withdrew
in quick succession. The withdrawals began in round 94 and ended in round 101.
It therefore seems natural to call rounds 1 to 101 “phase 1” of the auction. After
Telefonica withdrew from the auction in round 133 it was clear that the auction
would end once one further bidder withdrew. Therefore, these rounds constituted
the “hot phase” of the auction, and we shall call them “phase 3”. We shall call the
intermediate rounds, i.e. rounds 102 to 133, “phase 2” of the auction. In phase 2
the number of bidders was thus ﬁrst eight and then seven. It appears natural to
divide phase 2 further into phases 2a and 2b, where phase 2a consists of rounds 102
to 121 in which the number of bidders was eight, and phase 2b, rounds 122 to 133,
when the number of bidders was seven. For simplicity we shall mostly treat phase
2 as just one phase. However, where this provides additional information, we shall
also employ the distinction between phases 2a and 2b.10
Next we indicate how the prices of the licenses developed during these three
phases. Here, and in the following, we mean by the “price” of a licence in any
particular round the minimum bid that is needed to overbid the currently leading
bidder in that round. Thus the price of a license in a round equals the bid made by
the currently leading bidder plus the minimum increment.11 In Figure 1 we show
the prices of licenses A and B as well as the price of the most expensive and the
price of the cheapest of licenses C, D and E in every round. The ﬁgures show that
the speed at which the prices of licenses A and B rose during the auction accelerated
in phase 2, and slowed down signiﬁcantly in phase 3.
3 Straightforward Bidding with Private Values: The
Case of Orange
Our focus in this paper is on documenting and explaining deviations from straight-
forward bidding and private values. To begin with, however, we give the example
of a company whose behaviour is largely in line with these hypotheses. We do
10We are grateful to Paul Klemperer for suggesting the distinction between phases 2a and 2b.
11Notice that our use of the expression “price” of a license diﬀers somewhat from the Radio-












     
  








Figure 1: License Prices in Million Pounds (top line: license B; next line: license
A; next line: maximum of the prices of C, D and E; bottom line: minimum of the
prices of C, D and E)
this, ﬁrstly, to clarify how the data can conﬁrm these hypotheses, and, secondly,
to indicate that not all,b u to n l ysome ﬁrms’ bidding behaviour deviates from the
hypotheses.
The bidder whose behaviour we consider in this section is Orange, one of the four
incumbents in the mobile telephone market in the UK. Orange won license E. Al-
though Orange’s behaviour was roughly as predicted by private values and straight-
forward bidding, it did not satisfy these hypotheses exactly. The most prominent
deviation was that Orange typically did not bid the minimum admissible bid. Bids
which exceed the minimum admissible bid are called “jump bids”. Orange frequently
placed such jump bids. However, the size of its jump bids never exceeded 5%. On
average, they bid 2.06% over the minimum admissible bid. These are relatively small
jump bids. We discuss possible rationales for jump bids in Börgers and Dustmann
(2001). For example, jump bids might have been placed with the aim of avoiding
ties, which occurred quite frequently in the auction. As indicated in Börgers and
Dustmann (2001) the existence of jump bids does not seem to be a very signiﬁcant
deviation from our hypotheses, and therefore we shall not focus on jump bids.
Orange only placed bids for licenses B and E. License A was, of course, not avail-
able to Orange. That Orange never bid for licenses C and D is somewhat surprising,
but can easily be rationalized within the private value paradigm by assuming that
Orange assigned value zero to these licenses. We therefore now focus on licenses B
and E.
Because Orange stayed in the auction until the end, its bidding behaviour does




























     
  











Figure 2: Oranges Bids for Large and Small Licences (Bids for Small Licenses: x,
Bids for Large Licenses: o)
have attached values to these licenses which by far exceeded the ﬁnal bids for these
licenses. We can, however, under the private value and straightforward bidding
hypothesis make inferences from Orange’s bidding behaviour regarding the diﬀerence
between its value for B and its value for E. To see this denote by vB Orange’s value
for license B and by vE their value for license E. Also, denote by pB the price of
license B and by pE the price of license E. Straightforward bidding means that
Orange bids for license B if and only if
vB − pB ≥ vE − pE ⇔
pB − pE ≤ vB − vE
Thus, whenever we observe Orange bid for B in some round, we can deduce that
the value diﬀerence vB − vE is at least as large as the price diﬀerence pB − pE in
that period. Similarly, whenever we observe Orange bid for E in some round, we
can deduce an upper bound for the value diﬀerence.
I nF i g u r e2w es h o wh o wt h ep r i c ed i ﬀerence pB−pE (in million Pounds) evolved
during the 150 rounds of the auction. We have marked each period in which Orange
bid for B with a circle and each period in which Orange bid for E with a cross.
Under straightforward bidding with private values, a horizontal line through Figure
2 which intersects the vertical axis at vB − vE will separate the circles from the
crosses. Indeed, under the private value and straightforward bidding hypothesis all
circles will be below that line, and all crosses will be above it. This follows from
the above inequality. Now, of course, we do not know vB − vE. But we can test in
the graph in Figure 2 whether bidding behaviour is compatible with our hypothesis
by checking whether there exists some horizontal line through Figure 2 with the
9property that all circles are below it and all crosses are above it.
It is easy to see that we can separate circles from crosses in Figure 2 by drawing a
horizontal line which intersects the vertical axis at roughly £270 million. This leaves
a few circles above the horizontal line, i.e. a few bids for license B are made although
the price diﬀerence is larger than this estimate of the value diﬀerence. However, the
diﬀerence between the price diﬀerence and the value diﬀerence is never very large,
at least not in relative terms. Below, we shall ﬁnd much larger deviations from
our benchmark hypothesis. Orange is one of the companies which comes closest to
satisfying our benchmark hypothesis.
4 Bidding for License B
We now turn to our case studies. We begin by considering the two main companies
which bid for license B. All companies were allowed to bid for this license. However,
from round 78 onwards only two companies, Vodafone and BT3G, bid for license
B. We shall focus on these two companies. Vodafone and BT3G were at the time
of the auction the two largest incumbents in the UK mobile phone market. If they
wanted to acquire a large third generation license they had to win license B.
Vodafone’s behaviour is easy to describe. They only bid for license B. Moreover
they always bid the minimum admissible bid for license B, with two exceptions. In
round 123 Vodafone placed a jump bid which exceeded the minimum bid by about
1.1%. In round 143 Vodafone placed a jump bid which exceeded the minimum
bid by about 1.3%.12 The latter bid was Vodafone’s ﬁnal bid in the auction. It
clinched license B for Vodafone. Note that both jump bids were relatively small,
for example they were smaller than the next minimum bid increment. Apart from
these two jump bids Vodafone’s behaviour is easily explained by the private value
and straightforward bidding hypothesis. They might have had a very high value of
B, far beyond the price ﬁnally achieved in the auction, and a very low value for all
other licenses.
Unlike Vodafone, BT3G placed bids on small and on large licenses. When bidding
for a small license BT3G always only bid for the cheapest of all small licenses. All
bids by BT3G were exactly equal to the lowest admissible bid. These aspects of
BT3G’s behaviour are thus easily compatible with our hypotheses.
What is less clear is how BT3G chose whether to bid for a large or a small
license. We construct in Figure 3 a graph for BT3G which is analogous to Figure 2
for Orange. Because BT3G always bid for the cheapest of licenses C, D and E we
assume that BT3G was indiﬀerent between the three small licenses, and therefore
display in Figure 2 the diﬀerence (in million Pounds) between the price of license B
and the lowest o ft h ep r i c e so fl i c e n s e sC ,Da n dE .A sb e f o r ew em a r kb i d sf o ra
large license by circles and bids for a small license by crosses. It is clear from Figure
3 that there is no horizontal line through the graph which would even approximately
separate circles from crosses. Thus, there is no consistently revealed valuation of
the advantage of having a large rather than a small license.
BT3G’s Bids in Phase 1
12Cramton (2001, p.50) writes that “Vodafone often would use jump bids (bids above the mini-
mum bid) to express its resolve in winning the B license.” But the claim that jump bids occurred







































     
  











Figure 3: BT3G’s Bids for Large and Small Licenses (Bids for Small Licenses: x;
Bids for Large Licenses: o)
To understand better what happened we consider separately BT3G’s behaviour
in the three phases of the auction which we deﬁned at the end of Section 2. Consider
ﬁrst phase 1. BT3G began by bidding for license B but abandoned bids for B in
round 17. In round 16, in which BT3G was still bidding for B, the price diﬀerence
between B and the small licenses was £247.3 million, whereas in round 17, when
BT3G bid for a small license, it was £277.2 million. Thus, under the hypothesis of
private values and straightforward bidding we would conclude after round 17 that
BT3G’s estimate of the value diﬀerence was between £247.3 million and £277.2
million. Until and including round 56 BT3G never bid again for license B. This is
consistent with the estimate just provided because throughout this period one had
to pay more than £277.2 million extra to obtain license B rather than a small license.
However, in round 57 BT3G suddenly bid for license B although the price dif-
ference was now £306.7 million. BT3G then switched frequently between bidding
for B and bidding for a small license. If one neglects the earlier bids, and focuses
on the bids from round 57 until the end of phase 1, then BT3G’s bids revealed that
their estimate of the extra value provided by license B in comparison to the smaller
licenses was between £310.1 million and £319.3 million. Thus BT3G’s estimate of
the extra value seems to have been revised upwards, but possibly only by as little
as 12%.
BT3G’s Bids in Phase 3
Before we turn to phase 2 we brieﬂy consider phase 3. In this phase BT3G placed
only six bids, and of these only one was for license B. The bid for license B occurred
when the diﬀerence in price between license B and the small licenses was lowest in
11phase 3. If we thus consider bidding in phase 3 in isolation, then this was entirely
compatible with the private values and straightforward bidding hypothesis. BT3G’s
bid in round 137 revealed that their estimate of the diﬀerence in value between a
large and a small license was not more than £1,945.1 million, and their bid in round
142 revealed that the estimate was not less than £1,854.6 million.13
BT3G’s Bids in Phase 2
It is now important to consider in detail what happened in the intermittent phase
2. Figure 3 shows that BT3G raised in three “waves” the amount that it was willing
to bid extra to obtain a large rather than a small license. The ﬁrst such wave began
in round 101, the round in which One.Tel withdrew. In that round BT3G placed
a bid on license B although the price diﬀerence was now £440.8 million, and thus
above their previous threshold of £319.3 million. BT3G kept bidding for B until
and including round 111 in which the price diﬀerence had reached £1,445.5 million.
This is the end of the ﬁrst wave. BT3G switched back to a small license and bid
for a small license even in round 119 although the price diﬀerence had now dropped
back to £1,428.3 million. The second and third waves of BT3G’s bidding for license
B in phase 2 both consisted only of two bids each. In the second wave (rounds 122
and 124) BT3G was willing to bid for license B until the price diﬀerence had reached
£1,530.8 million, and in the third wave (rounds 129 and 131) BT3G was willing to
bid for license B until the price diﬀerence had reached £1,781.5 million.
The Main Questions
The most important deviation of BT3G’s behaviour from our benchmark hy-
pothesis is the apparent rise in BT3G’s evaluation of the diﬀerence between a big
and a small license at the beginning of phase 2 of the auction. A second puzzle is
why in phase 2 BT3G occasionally did not bid for license B although the price dif-
ference had fallen below a level at which BT3G had placed bids for license B before.
We now discuss alternatives to our benchmark hypothesis which can explain some
of this behaviour.
What Caused BT3G to Bid for Large or Small Licenses?
Bidding in Early Rounds Is Arbitrary: The simplest explanation of the
rise in BT3G’s evaluation of the diﬀerence between a big and a small license is
that bidding in the early rounds was arbitrary, as the number of active bidders
exceeded the number of available licenses signiﬁcantly, and therefore the probability
of the auction ending soon was so low that bids weren’t really signiﬁcant. We point
out, however, that our data show that BT3G’s bidding behaviour in these rounds
is remarkably consistent. This suggests that BT3G’s behaviour was not arbitrary.
Of course, it may have been guided by considerations other than myopic surplus
maximisation. We discuss this possibility later.
Budget constraints: It seems plausible that companies which participated
in the UK auction faced budget constraints. The government had oﬀered successful
bidders two options for paying for their licenses: either instantaneous payment after
13A value diﬀerence in this interval also rationalizes BT3G’s six bids in phase 2b except the bid
for license C in round 126 when the price diﬀerence was only £1,762.6 million.
12the end of the auction, or deferred payment where 50 % had to be paid instan-
taneously and the remaining 50% plus interest had to be paid over the next ﬁve
years.14 Companies seem to have regarded the option of deferred payment as obvi-
ously too costly (National Audit Oﬃce (2001, p.31)). It then seems plausible that
the bidders arranged their funding before or during the auction. Apparent changes in
bidding strategies during the auction may be due to changes in companies’ ﬁnancial
situation.
In the case of BT3G the willingness to bid more aggressively for license B from
round 101 onwards might be due to the fact that BT3G had arranged additional
ﬁnance at that time. It had perhaps become clear that more money was needed than
had been initially raised. If ﬁnance was arranged in round numbers, then it might
be relevant that up to round 94 the largest bid by BT3G had been £2,339.9 million
(in round 94). In round 99 they made their ﬁrst bid that was above £2,5000 million.
Thus, up to that point £2,5000 million might have been their budget constraint.
This argument does not explain BT3G’s frequent switching between large and small
licenses at the later stages of the auction, but a more complicated ﬁnancial history
might account for that, too.
There is another way in which budget constraints might have aﬀected BT3G’s
bidding. If the bidders in the auction were subject to budget constraints then each
bidder may have had an incentive to drive up the prices which other bidders had to
pay, either to weaken these other bidders in subsequent European spectrum auctions,
or to make it harder for them to ﬁnance the investments needed to oﬀer attractive
third generation services in the UK. Thus the primary aim of the bids which BT3G
made for license B in phases 2 and 3 of the auction may have been to raise the price
which Vodafone had to pay for license B. It may not actually have been BT3G’s
purpose to win that license themselves. Such a strategy is rational only if BT3G
is suﬃciently convinced that every bid which it places on license B will be overbid.
BT3G might have become convinced of this because, as explained earlier, Vodafone’s
strategy from the beginning of the auction had been to bid only for license B and
to overbid every bid placed on that license. As Cramton (2001, p.50) writes one
can interpret Vodafone’s behaviour as an expression of “its resolve in winning the
B license”. This exposed Vodafone to the risk that other companies such as BT3G
would place bids on license B solely to raise the price which Vodafone had to pay. On
the other hand nobody could ever be completely sure that Vodafone would behave
in the future as it had done in the past. The bids placed in the later phases of the
auction were very large. BT3G always ran the risk that Vodafone abandoned license
B in which case BT3G would most likely be stuck with its bid. This speaks against
this theory. We also note that this argument does not explain BT3G’s frequent
switching between license B and small licenses.
Social learning: Companies might have learned from other companies’ bid-
ding behaviour about the true value of the licenses for which they were bidding.
Since Milgrom and Weber’s seminal (1982) paper this eﬀect has received much at-
t e n t i o ni nt h ea u c t i o nl i t e r a t u r e . 15
14Special rules applied to Vodafone and Orange because of the connection created between these
two companies by Vodafone’s succesful takeover of Mannesmann, which owned Orange.
15We use in this paper the phrase “social learning” rather than the more conventional termi-
nology of “common” or “aﬃiliated values” in order to emphasize that what matters is really the
informational eﬀe c tt h a to n eﬁrm can learn from other ﬁrm’s private information by observing its
actions.
13In the current auction it seems plausible that some such social learning has
taken place. But a priori one would expect this eﬀect to be of minor quantitative
importance. Social learning is an important quantitative eﬀect only if some bidders
hold private information which is potentially of large commercial signiﬁcance to other
bidders. At the time of the auction there was large uncertainty about the economic
value of third generation mobile telephone technology, but this uncertainty seems to
persist until today. It does not seem plausible that at the time of the auction any
one bidder had highly signiﬁcant private information.
We now turn to the data. A ﬁrst potential source of information to British
Telecom about the added value of holding a large licence were other bidders’ bids
placed for license B. As we mentioned earlier from round 78 onwards Vodafone was
the only other company that bid for license B. It is conceivable that Vodafone’s
strategy of not bidding for a small license, and its willingness to counter every bid
by BT3G for license B, lead BT3G to revise its estimates of the value diﬀerence
upwards.
BT3G might also have learned about the value diﬀerence between a large and a
small licence from observing bidding on the other large license A. However, as we
argue in the next section, it seems that the acceleration in the price of license A
in phase 2 followed that for license B rather than the other way round. Thus, we
believe that it is more likely that bidders for license A learned from the bidding for
license B than that the bidders for license B learned from the bidding for license A.
BT3G might also have learned about the value diﬀerence between a large and a
small licence by observing bids placed on the smaller licences. For example, the bids
placed by NTL Mobile which we discuss below suggested that NTL Mobile’s estimate
of the value diﬀerence between a large and a small license gradually increased in
phase 1 of the auction. Observing this eﬀect might have lead BT3G to revise its
own estimate.
The precise quantitative form in which a bidder could learn in the auction from
other bidders’ behaviour will depend on this bidder’s prior beliefs as well as this
bidder’s beliefs about other bidders’ behaviour. It seems hard to ﬁnd a speciﬁcation
of these beliefs which would explain the suddenness of the change in BT3G’s be-
haviour at the end of round 100 and the size of this change, or which would explain
the apparent occasional downward shifts in beliefs in phase 2. We have not explored
this issue any further, but the hypothesis seems extremely speculative.
There is another way in which social learning might contribute to an explanation
of BT3G’s bids. BT3G might have tried to manipulate other companies’ learning
behaviour. In particular, it might have tried to conceal initially its estimate of the
value diﬀerence between a large and a small license. One indication that this might
h a v eb e e nt h ec a s ei st h ef a c tt h a tt h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ev a l u ed i ﬀerence between a
large and a small license revealed by BT3G’s early bids in phase 1 of the auction
was very close to that revealed by the other incumbent who bid on large as well as
small licenses in that phase, namely Orange. Orange’s bidding, though not entirely
consistent, suggested that their estimate of the value diﬀerence was around £270
million. BT3G might have deliberately tried not to deviate from this too much. In
the language of game theory, BT3G might have tried to play a “pooling strategy,”
concealing its true information from the market by behaving like a competitor.
The question arises what BT3G could gain by such a strategy. The purpose
might have been to induce other bidders to drop out of the auction. Once that
was achieved in round 101, BT3G might have felt ready to place much higher bids.
14Thus it appears conceivable that a pooling rationale explains BT3G’s strategy. A
question then is why other companies did not adopt the same strategy as BT3G.
In particular, Vodafone seems to have seen an advantage in exactly the opposite
strategy: stating publicly a strong interest in license B, and never moving away
from it. Perhaps Vodafone’s managers held diﬀerent subjective beliefs about the
situation.
Allocative externalities: Companies’ valuation of a license may depend
on which other bidders will win a license. If this is the case one speaks of “alloca-
tive externalities”. The potential importance of allocative externalities for license
auctions has been emphasized by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) and (2001). In the
case of the UK auction one might speculate that BT3G’s apparent changes in their
v a l u a t i o no fl i c e n s eBi nc o m p a r i s o nt oas m a l ll i c e n s em i g h th a v eb e e nd r i v e nb y
BT3G’s expectations of who else would win a license. We investigate now evidence
which might show whether this was indeed the case. A problem which we face is
t h a tt h en u m b e ro fw a y si nw h i c hB T 3 G ’ sv a l u a t i o no fl i c e n s eBi nc o m p a r i s o nt oa
small license might have depended on who else wins a license is very large. We shall
focus here on two hypotheses which seem to us particularly plausible a priori.
The ﬁrst is that BT3G’s incentive to acquire a large rather than a small licence
might have been aﬀected by how likely it appeared that TIW was going to win
license A, as it eventually did. One reason for this might have been that TIW was
backed by the ﬁnancially very strong Hutchison Whampoa group, a former owner of
Orange, and BT3G might have been aware of this. BT3G might have viewed TIW
as a particularly formidable competitor in the UK market.
To evaluate whether this hypothesis contributes to the explanation of our bidding
data we ask whether BT3G revealed a consistent estimate of the value diﬀerence
between license B and the small licenses if one conditions on whether TIW is the
current leader on A. This assumes that BT3G took the current leadership on license
A as an indication of who might win license A. The assumption is in line with the
myopia assumed in straightforward bidding, but obviously it can be criticized. We
see no more plausible alternative to this assumption, though.
It turns out that conditioning on whether TIW is current leader on A does not
eliminate the inconsistencies in BT3G’s bids. To show this we begin with Table 3
w h i c hs h o w st h en u m b e ro fb i d sp l a c e db yB T 3 Go nl i c e n s eBa n do nt h es m a l l
licenses as a function of the event that TIW was the current leader for license A.
The data shown are for all rounds. We show in brackets the data for rounds 101-150
only.
TIW is current TIW is not current Total
leader on A leader on A
BT3G bids for B 7( 4 ) 26 (7) 33 (11)
BT3G bids for C,D or E 11 (10) 63 (2) 74 (12)
Total 18 (14) 89 (9) 107 (23)
Table 3: BT3G’s bids conditional on the leading bidder for license A.
(Data in brackets concern rounds 101-150 only.)
The ﬁr s tf a c tt on o t ei st h a tB T 3 Gp l a c e ds i g n i ﬁcant numbers of bids on small
licenses in phase 1 of the auction, both when TIW was current leader on A and
15when TIW was not current leader on A. As a consequence BT3G’s bidding in phase
1 of the auction revealed an upper boundary for both conditional value diﬀerences
which were certainly not larger than the highest price diﬀerence in phase 1. Next
observe that BT3G placed signiﬁcant numbers of bids on license B in phase 2, both
when TIW was the current leader on A, and when TIW was not the current leader
on A. Thus, we obtain lower boundaries for the conditional value diﬀerences which
are certainly much larger than the upper boundaries in phase 1 (compare Figure 3).
Thus, the inconsistencies between phase 1 and phases 2 and 3 do not disappear if
one conditions on whether TIW is the current leader on A.
One might still hope that the proposed externality concerning the winner of
license A could provide an explanation of BT3G’s behaviour in phases 2 and 3 only,
neglecting phase 1. However, this is not the case. Considering ﬁrst periods in which
TIW was leading on A, we note that the last bid of the ﬁrst “wave” of bidding for B
fell into a period in which TIW was leading on A. All of the immediately following
bids for a small license except the ﬁrst one were also made when TIW was leading on
A. As Figure 3 indicates this implies that there is no conditional estimate of the value
diﬀerence which could rationalize BT3G’s bids. Considering next periods in which
companies other than TIW were leading on A we note that in round 113 BT3G bid
for a small license, thus providing us with an upper boundary for the conditional
value diﬀerence of £1,733.6 million, but in round 131 BT3G bid for license B, thus
providing us with a lower boundary for the conditional value diﬀerence of £1,71.5
million. Thus, there is again no consistent conditional value diﬀerence.
The second possibility which we have investigated is that the anticipated number
of other incumbents acquiring a license might have been a factor. BT3G began bid-
ding aggressively for license B when four bidders had left the auction and a ﬁfth had
asked for a waiver round. At that stage it seemed more likely that more incumbents
would hold licenses, and this might have triggered for some reason an increase in
the extra value which BT3G attached to a large license in comparison to a small
license. The beginning of the second “wave” of BT3G’s bids for B followed similarly
immediately after Worldcom withdrew in round 121. However, the beginning of the
third “wave” is not associated with any withdrawal, and instead the end of the third
“wave” coincides with Telefonica’s withdrawal from the auction in round 133.
An alternative way of looking at this issue is to regard the current number of
incumbents who are leading bidders on a license as a predictor of the number of
incumbents who will ultimately win a license, and to ask whether conditional on
this predictor BT3G revealed consistent estimates of the value diﬀerences. Table 4
shows the frequency of bids by BT3G on license B as a function of the number of
incumbents leading on a license. We have made one correction in this table, though.
We have not counted an incumbent as leading bidder on a license if the bid that
BT3G was about to place displaced that leading bidder. Suppose, for example, that
incumbents were leading on B, C and E, and that BT3G was about to bid for B.
Then we counted this as a bid for B with two (not three) incumbents leading on
other licenses, because BT3G knew that it would displace the leader on B from
his position. Like in Table 3 information which relates only to rounds 101-150 is
i n d i c a t e di nb r a c k e t s .
160 incumbents 1 incumbent 2 incumbents 3 incumbents Total
leadingon leading on leading on leading on
B, C, D or E B, C, D or E B, C, D or E B, C, D or E
Bids for B 14 (0) 10 (4) 9( 7 ) 0( 0 ) 33 (11)
Bids for C,D or E 0( 0 ) 36 (2) 34 (6) 4( 4 ) 74 (12)
Total 14 (0) 46 (6) 43 (13) 4( 4 ) 107 (23)
Table 4: BT3G’s bids conditional on the number of leading incumbents.
(Data in brackets concern rounds 101-150 only.)
Table 4 indicates that trivially there will be conditional value diﬀerences which
rationalize BT3G’s bids if we condition on the event that zero incumbents are leading
on B, C, D and E. In this event BT3G never bid for B. Table 4 also seems to indicate
that we can obtain a conditional value diﬀerence for the case that 3 incumbents are
l e a d i n go nB ,C ,Da n dE .I nt h i sc a s eB T 3 Gn e v e rb i df o rB .F o rt h ei n t e r m e d i a t e
c a s e sa na r g u m e n ts i m i l a rt ot h eo n ew eu s e de a r l i e ri nt h ec o n t e x to fT a b l e3s u g g e s t s
that there is no conditional value diﬀerence which rationalizes bids across phases 1,
2 and 3. We could consider phases 2 and 3 in isolation, but a simple analysis shows
that this does not aﬀect the conclusion.
Shareholders’ Opinion: Bidders in the auction are likely to have monitored
carefully the views of their shareholders. These views might have expressed them-
selves in share prices. Managers might for example have found that the share price
responded very negatively to particular bids, and might have avoided such bids in
the future. Table 5 shows British Telecom’s, and, for comparison purposes, also
Vodafone’s share prices at the London Stock Exchange on three crucial dates: on
the last trading day before the auction began, on the last trading day before phase 2
of the auction began, and on the last day of the auction. In brackets we indicate the
change in comparison to the share price on the last trading day before the auction
began.16 The table indicates that British Telecom’s share price seemed to suﬀer
more than that of Vodafone at the end of phase 1 of the auction. When the auction
was over British Telecom’s share price had recaptured some of its losses whereas
Vodafone’s share price had gone down further.
Share price before Share price before Share price after
round 1 (3 March) round 99 (4 April) round 150 (27 April)
British Telecom 1169.98 985.91 (-16%) 1016.44 (-13%)
Vodafone 369.5 321.5 (-13%) 279.25 (-24%)
Table 5: BT and Vodafone share prices in £s.
One might argue that the stock market signalled to BT3G that its bidding in
phase 1 was too conservative, and BT3G’s more aggressive bidding in phases 2 and
3 might have lead to the recovery in its share prices. A cross company comparison













































     
  






Figure 4: Ratio of British Telecom and Vodafone’s share prices (BT3G’s Bids for
Small licenses: x; BT3G’s Bids for Large Licenses: o; Days on which the London
Stock Exchange traded but the auction didn’t take place: ¤).
for phases 2 and 3 suggests the reverse eﬀect, though. The more aggressive bid-
der, Vodafone, suﬀered losses, whereas the less aggressive bidder, British Telecom,
gained.
Table 5 hides large volatility in share prices. In Figure 4 we show the ratio of
BT3G’s and Vodafone’s share price at the London Stock Exchange. The purpose of
considering this ratio is to keep track of the relative stock market success of the two
companies. We have normalized the ratio to equal 1 on the last trading day before
the auction (3 March 2000). For each round we indicate the value of the share price
ratio on the preceding trading day.
Figure 4 conﬁrms that British Telecom did worse than Vodafone in phase 1, and
t h eF i g u r eh i n t sa tt h ee ﬀect that bids for small licenses lead to downward movements
in the ratio whereas bids for large licenses lead to upward movements. However,
BT3G’s more aggressive bidding for B in phase 2 initially lead to a dramatic fall in
the share price ratio, and if BT3G had kept track of this one might have expected
them to abandon this strategy earlier than they actually did. Considering phases 2
and 3 overall there does not seem to be any predictable eﬀe c to fb i d sf o rBo nt h e
share price ratio.
Management disagreements: Shifts in a company’s bidding strategy may
also be due to changing power structures in that company’s management. Thus
BT3G’s more aggressive bidding for a large licence from period 101 onwards may
be due to the fact that a diﬀerent group in its management won control of the
bidding strategy. An indicator that there was a potential for disagreement is that
Sir Christopher Bland, when becoming new chairman of British Telecom in April
182001, commented that in his opinion the company “should never have bid for a third-
generation telephone licence” (Independent on Sunday, 2001). The “Independent on
Sunday” added: “However, he is not critical of BT’s board for bidding for a licence:
‘Hindsight is a wonderful thing.’ ” It is, however, hard to conceive of an ongoing
power struggle which would induce BT3G to switch back and forth between small
and large licenses as they did in the auction.
Summary
We ﬁnd little direct evidence for any of the hypotheses which we consider. How-
ever, the most plausible speculations seem to be that BT3G’s initial reluctance to
bid for license B was either due to budget constraints, or a deliberate strategy to
conceal its true valuation of license B. Behaviour throughout the auction may also
have been aﬀected by management disagreements.
5 Bidding for License A
The leading bidders for license A were TIW and NTL Mobile. Both bidders partic-
ipated in the auction until its end. TIW ultimately won license A, and it was NTL
Mobile’s decision to withdraw from the auction in round 150 which triggered the end
of the auction. We conclude that these two companies were the leading contenders
for license A because after round 108 there was only one bid from another bidder
for license A, namely the bid by Worldcom in round 116. In round 108 the price
of license A had reached £3,000 million. At the end of the auction it was £4,384.7
million. Thus, there was a signiﬁcant price increase, and it was largely due to these
two contenders’ bids.
The bidding competition between TIW and NTL Mobile for license A took place
in phase 2 of the auction. It was settled by the end of phase 2 in round 133. At that
stage TIW was the leading bidder for license A, and its position was not challenged
any further in phase 3. Note, however, that NTL Mobile made some bids for small
licenses in phase 3.
As outsiders to the UK mobile telephone market TIW and NTL Mobile were
allowed to bid for licenses A and B when bidding for a large license. However, license
A was somewhat larger than license B, and it was also for most of the auction cheaper
than license B. There were only 15 rounds in which license A was more expensive
than license B. The last such round was round 76. The largest diﬀerence in price
was £77.6 million, which is less than 2% of the ﬁnal price of licence A. All this seems
to suggest that almost always A was the better deal than B. We do indeed ﬁnd that
NTL Mobile never bid for license B. TIW is one of the few outsiders who did place
bids on licence B. However, all bids by TIW for license B occurred very early in the
auction. From round 14 onwards, TIW did not bid for licence B again.
If we neglect TIW’s early bids for B we can simplify the argument, and assume
that TIW and NTL Mobile faced a choice between bidding for the large licence A
and bidding for one of the smaller licenses C, D or E. When choosing for which of
licenses C, D or E to bid, both companies did not necessarily choose the cheapest
of these licenses. This suggests that they might have had preferences over these
apparently very similar licenses. In our earlier paper (Börgers and Dustmann (2001))
we have used a random utility model to estimate the value diﬀerences. Our estimates







































     
  






Figure 5: TIW’s Bids for Large and Small Licenses (Bids for Small Licenses: x, Bids
for Large Licenses: o)
whereas TIW ranked them in reverse alphabetical order: E, D, and C. However, none
of the estimated value diﬀerences was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover,
as the prices of licenses C, D and E stayed very close together, as can be seen in
Figure 1, this is not a major issue. To simplify our arguments we shall work with
the assumption that TIW and NTL Mobile were indiﬀerent between licenses C, D
and E.
Both TIW and NTL Mobile deviated from the rules of straightforward bidding,
and did not always bid the minimum bid. If we ignore for TIW their somewhat
erratic bids in round 1-13, then we ﬁnd that 30 % of TIW’s bids were jump bids.
For NTL Mobile the percentage of jump bids is 32 %. The average size of TIW’s
jump bids after rounds 1-13 was 2.10% above the required minimum bid, and the
average size of NTL Mobile’s jump bids was 1.96 % above the minimum bid. As
before, we argue that the jump bids are relatively small, and a minor deviation from
our hypotheses.
The ﬁnal and most important step of our analysis is to consider how TIW and
NTL Mobile chose whether to bid for a large or a small license. Figures 5 and 6
describe these choices. The ﬁgures are analogous to Figures 2 and 3 which referred
to Orange and BT3G. The ﬁgures indicate that neither of the two companies placed
their bids in accordance with the hypothesis of straightforward bidding under private
values. As was the case with BT3G we regard these deviations from the straightfor-
ward bidding hypothesis as the most important deviations, and therefore focus on
them in this section.
We begin our discussion with TIW. Recall that TIW was leading bidder on







































     
  






Figure 6: NTL Mobile’s Bids for Large And Small Licences (Bids for Small Licences:
x; Bids for Large Licences: o)
phase 3. Therefore we can restrict attention to phases 1 and 2.
T I W ’ sB i d si nP h a s e1
Note that Figure 5 ignores rounds 1-13 because in these rounds TIW placed bids
on license B which are hard to explain, as we discussed above. In the subsequent
rounds of phase 1 TIW only made two further bids for license A. One was in round 29
when the price diﬀerence was £176.2 million. The second was in round 98 when the
price diﬀerence was £92.8 million. The bid in round 29 is puzzling because in later
rounds the price diﬀerence was much lower, yet TIW did not bid for license A. The
second bid is easier to understand because it was made when the price diﬀerence was
lower than it had been in any round since round 9. Thus we treat the bid in round
29 as an outlier, and deduce that TIW’s revealed extra value attached to license A
in comparison to a small license was between £92.8 million (the price diﬀerence in
round 98) and £107.7 million (the price diﬀerence in round 14).
T I W ’ sB i d si nP h a s e2
TIW’s ﬁrst bid in phase 2 was a bid for license D in round 104. This bid
was entirely consistent with their behaviour in phase 1. However, in round 106
they suddenly started to bid for license A again. At this stage the price diﬀerence
between A and the small licenses was £200.2 million, a diﬀerence which in round 1
they would have regarded as prohibitive. TIW continued with four further bids for
license A. The last of these bids, in round 116, was at a price diﬀerence of £745.4
million. Like in the case of BT3G we ﬁnd that in the early rounds of phase 2 there
21was apparently a sudden and dramatic revision upwards in TIW’s estimate of the
extra value of a large license.
TIW’s four further bids in the auction are somewhat surprising because they
suggest a downward revision of the estimate of the diﬀerence. In round 124, when the
price diﬀerence had dropped to £674.7 million TIW refused to bid for A and instead
bid for E. In round 126, when the price diﬀerence was £653.2 million TIW returned
to licence A. Thus it seemed that their estimated value diﬀerence was now between
£653.2 million and £674.7 million. The ﬁnal two bids by TIW were compatible with
this estimated value diﬀerence. This value diﬀerence thus rationalizes all bids by
TIW in phase 2b of the auction.
NTL Mobile’s Bids in Phase 1
NTL Mobile in phase 1 gradually moved its revealed estimate of the extra value
of holding large license A upwards. For example, in round 1 NTL Mobile bid for
license A when the price diﬀerence was only £35.7 million. In round 2 it was willing
to bid again for license A although now the price diﬀerence had gone up to £89.2
million. This second bid was the highest bid in its round and NTL Mobile entered
rounds 3, 4 and 5 as the leading bidder for license A. In round 5 it was overbid by
another bidder. In round 6, when the price diﬀerence between license A and the
small licenses had reached £96.8 million, NTL Mobile decided not to bid for A again,
but to switch to C. At this stage it seemed that NTL Mobile’s estimate of the added
value of a large license in comparison to a small license had been pinned down quite
precisely. However, shortly afterwards, in round 11, when the price diﬀerence was
£103.7 million, NTL Mobile bid again for A. In round 13 when the price diﬀerence
had gone up to £114.2 million NTL Mobile abandoned A again. At that stage NTL
Mobile’s evaluations seemed to have been narrowed down again, except that in round
19, when the price diﬀerence was £116.6 million, NTL Mobile returned to license
A. This pattern continued until round 68 when NTL Mobile bid for license A at a
price diﬀerence of £402.4 million.
There was then a break in NTL Mobile’s behaviour. For the rest of phase 1 of
the auction NTL Mobile bid only one more time for license A although the price
diﬀerence between license A and the smaller licenses fell considerably. NTL Mobile
was not even willing to bid for license A in round 83 when the price diﬀerence had
fallen back to £118.8 million. The one bid which it did make for license A is hard
to explain. It was made at a price diﬀerence of £287.5 million in round 77.
NTL Mobile’s Bids in Phase 2
Phase 2 of the auction began in NTL Mobile’s case really in 100. At that stage
four ﬁrms had withdrawn, and One.Tel had asked for a “waiver”. These waivers
had turned out to be advance indicators of the withdrawal of a bidder. In phase 2
NTL Mobile began to bid much more aggressively for license A. We can distinguish
three “waves”, although the ﬁrst and third wave are relatively short. NTL Mobile
began bidding for license A at a price diﬀerence of £222.5 million in round 100.
It abandoned license A though in round 103 when the price diﬀerence went up to
£411.6 million and wasn’t even willing to bid for A in round 105 when the price
diﬀerence had fallen to £200.2 million. In round 110 a second “wave” started, and
NTL Mobile returned to license A at a price diﬀerence of £396.9 million, and was
willing to bid for license A even at much higher price diﬀerences. In fact, the next
22seven bids of NTL Mobile can all be rationalized by postulating a value diﬀerence
between £666.1 million and £673.1 million. NTL Mobile concluded phase 2 with a
surprising bid for license A in round 127 when the price diﬀerence had gone up to
£749.2 million.17
NTL Mobile’s Bids in Phase 3
NTL Mobile did not bid for license A at all in phase 3 but instead bid three
times for a small license. This is surprising because TIW entered this phase as the
leading bidder for license A and was not challenged any further in that position. As
a consequence the price diﬀerence between license A and the small licenses dropped
in phase 3, and was only £381.1 million at the end of the auction. Despite of this
drop in the price diﬀerence NTL Mobile did not return to bidding for A.
The Main Questions
As in the case of BT3G in the previous section the most important issue is
p r o b a b l y :“ W h a tl e a dT I Wa n dN T LM o b i l et ob i ds om u c hm o r ea g g r e s s i v e l yf o ra
large license after the end of phase 1?” In the case of NTL Mobile we have, however,
additional interesting questions: What caused the gradual increase in NTL Mobile’s
estimate of the value diﬀerence in the early part of phase 1? What caused NTL
Mobile to abandon bidding for license A in the late part of phase 1? Why did NTL
Mobile not bid for license A in phase 3? We now investigate whether the ideas
which were introduced in the previous section can contribute to answers to these
four questions.
TIW’s and NTL Mobile’s Bids: Some Explanations
Bidding in Early Rounds Is Arbitrary: The break between phase 1 and later
phases is easiest explained by arguing that bids in phase 1 were placed in arbitrary
ways because it was unlikely that the auction would close soon. As indicated above
we do indeed ﬁnd that TIW’s bids in rounds 1-13 are hard to rationalize, and those
bids might be regarded as arbitrary. TIW’s choices in rounds 14-100 do not seem
arbitrary, however. Indeed, TIW systematically avoided bidding for A.
Unlike TIW, NTL Mobile made bids for license A throughout the ﬁrst 100 peri-
ods. Its behaviour does not appear to be arbitrary, but it seems to reveal a mono-
tonically increasing value diﬀerence between license A and the small licenses.
To dismiss early bids for A as arbitrary one would, moreover, have to argue that
the fact that many bidders were still left in the auction implied that bids for license
A were almost certain to be overbid by some other bidder. However, for license A,
unlike for license B, there was no bidder who was clearly determined to win the
license. Thus, any bid that was placed on license A seemed to run a risk of being
the last bid for that license.
Budget Constraints: Could budget constraints explain TIW’s decision to place
so few bids for license A in the ﬁrst phase of the auction? We argue that this is not
17Considering phases 2a and 2b separately does not add much insight into NTL Mobile’s be-
haviour. In phase 2b they placed only two bids. Both were for A. One of them was compatible with
the earlier revealed price diﬀerence, and the second one was the one in round 127 to which we refer
in the main text.
23a plausible explanation. The highest bid which TIW placed in the ﬁrst phase was a
bid of £2,339.1 million for license D in round 100. In all rounds up to round 98 a
budget of this size would have permitted TIW also to bid for license A.
The impact of budget constraints appears to be more interesting in the case
of NTL Mobile. NTL Mobile twice ceased to bid for license A in a somewhat
unexpected manner. The ﬁrst instance followed round 77 in which NTL Mobile
became leading bidder for license A. When NTL Mobile was overbid by Worldcom
in round 7918, NTL Mobile refused to counter. The minimum admissible bid for
license A in round 79 was £1,601.9 million. NTL Mobile bid instead for the smaller
license D at £1,343.5 million. It then continued bidding for the smaller license for
a while even though the price diﬀerence between a large and a small license had
by now fallen. One might think that this was due to budget constraints. However,
already in round 86 NTL Mobile was able to bid £1637.2 million for license D which
was more than had been necessary for license A in round 79. Thus, we believe that
it is unlikely that NTL Mobile’s abandonment of license A in phase 1 was due to
budget constraints.
NTL Mobile’s last bid for license A was in round 127 when it bid £4,277.7
million. This bid was overbid by TIW in round 131. NTL Mobile did not bid again
for license A, nor did any other bidder. To overbid TIW NTL Mobile would have
had to bid £4,494.4 million. NTL Mobile instead bid for smaller licenses, with its
highest subsequent bid being £3,970.5 million. Thus it may well have been that NTL
Mobile had a budget constraint of, say, £4,300 million, and that this was the reason
why it did not continue to bid for A. Thus, we conclude that budget constraints may
provide a plausible explanation for NTL Mobile’s second, although not for its ﬁrst
abandonment of license A.
As explained in the previous section the existence of budget constraints intro-
duces an additional bidding motive into auctions: bidders might place bids to raise
the price which their competitors have to pay, with the intention of weakening the
competitors in future interactions. One might speculate in this way that NTL Mo-
bile placed its last bids for license A without serious intention of buying license A,
but instead to raise the price which TIW had to pay. The owners of NTL Mobile,
NTL and France Telecom, might have anticipated that one of them would acquire
a license through a takeover, as France Telecom indeed did, and that therefore they
h a da ni n c e n t i v et oﬁnancially weaken a potential competitor, TIW. If this strategy
was pursued it was very risky, because bids for A always seemed to run the risk of
being the last bid for A, and therefore could not be placed spuriously. We therefore
do not attach much weight to this hypothesis.
Social Learning: TIW and NTL Mobile were both outsiders to the UK mobile
telephone market. This suggests that more established ﬁrms might have had better
information about the chances of third generation technology in the United King-
dom, and that TIW and NTL Mobile tried to deduce other ﬁrms’ information from
these ﬁrms’ bidding behaviour. We begin by considering whether this hypothesis
can help to explain the apparent sudden increase in phase 2 of both companies’
estimates of the additional value of a large license in comparison to a small license.
In this context it seems interesting that bidding for A lagged a little bit behind
18We focus at this point on round 77 rather than round 68, which we emphasized earlier, because
for the question whether a budget constraint was eﬀective only the very last bid for A in phase 1
matters.
24bidding for B. For example, the unexpectedly high bids for license B which we have
identiﬁed in the previous section were placed from round 101 onwards. We ﬁnd that
unexpectedly high bids for license A began to be placed from round 106 onwards.
Bidding on license B ceased for a while between rounds 113 and round 121. Sim-
ilarly, no new bid was made for license A between rounds 117 and 122. Bidding
for license B ceased again between rounds 126 and 128. Similarly bidding for A
stopped between 128 and 130. Thus, one might speculate that the outsiders who
bid for license A learned from the insider bids placed on license B that the diﬀerence
in value between a large and a small license was larger than they had originally
thought. It is surprising, however, that outsiders were ready to revise their initial
beliefs so quickly, and to such a large extent.
As in the case of BT3G we might also speculate that TIW tried to “hide” its true
valuation of a large license in the early rounds of the auction, and that its purpose
was to manipulate the learning of other ﬁrms. However, this speculation is hard to
reconcile with the fact that TIW placed some aggressive jump bids for licenses A
and B in the very ﬁrst rounds of the auction.
Social learning might be an explanation of the apparent rise in NTL Mobile’s
estimate of the value diﬀerence in the ﬁrst 68 rounds of the auction. NTL Mobile
might have observed other companies’ willingness to bid for a large license and it
might have revised its own estimate of the value diﬀerence in the light of what it
observed. However, it is hard to see why this eﬀect abruptly stopped after round
68.
Allocative Externalities: TIW and NTL Mobile’s valuation of the diﬀerence
between a large and a small license may have been a function of which other compa-
nies seemed likely to win a license. We begin by examining whether TIW’s willing-
ness to bid for license A rather than a small license was a function of which company
was the currently leading bidder for the other large license, license B. Table 6 shows
the number of TIW’s bids for license A and small licenses depending on whether
Vodafone, BT3G or some other company was the currently leading bidder for B. We
ignore rounds 1-13 for the reasons explained earlier.
Vodafone BT3G is Other Total
is current current current
leader on B leader on B leader on B
TIW bids for A 7( 5 ) 2( 2 ) 0( 0 ) 9( 7 )
TIW bids for C,D or E 42 (2) 6( 0 ) 4( 0 ) 52 (2)
Total 49 (7) 8( 2 ) 4( 0 ) 61 (9)
Table 6: TIW’s bids conditional on the leading bidder for B.
(Data in brackets concern rounds 106-150 only.)
We interpret Table 6 in conjunction with Figure 5. Consider ﬁrst the event that
Vodafone is the current leader on B. The fact that conditional on this event TIW
placed bids both on license A and on small licenses, both in the ﬁrst 105 rounds and
also in the subsequent rounds, immediately implies that there is no value diﬀerence
which could rationalize TIW’s bids across the diﬀerent phases of the auction. The
same conclusion can easily be obtained by inspection of Table 6 and Figure 5 for
25the event that BT3G was current leader on B. For the event that a company other
than Vodafone or BT3G is current leader on B we observe bids by TIW only in the
ﬁrst 105 rounds of the auction, not later. Therefore, this case is not relevant to our
discussion here.
We have also investigated whether conditioning on the total number of incum-
bents leading on any license might allow us to ﬁnd value diﬀerences which rationalize
T I W ’ sb i d s . H o w e v e r ,a si nt h ec a s eo fB T 3 G ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s e . W eo m i tt h e
details. Our conclusion is that there is no evidence that TIW’s bids were aﬀected
by allocative externalities.
We next turn to the question whether allocative externalities might have aﬀected
NTL Mobile’s bids. The potential externalities which we discuss are again ﬁrstly
whether the current leader on license B might aﬀect whether NTL Mobile bids for
a large or a small license, and secondly whether the total number of incumbents
leading on any license might aﬀect NTL Mobile’s decision. If our primary interest is
in explaining the escalation in bids for a large license from round 100 onwards then
the picture is similar to the picture in the case of TIW. We ﬁnd no evidence that
externalities can contribute to an explanation of NTL Mobile’s choices. We omit
the details.
This leaves the question whether allocative externalities might contribute to an
explanation of NTL Mobile’s behaviour if we restrict attention to either phase 1, or
to phases 2 and 3. We do not have any positive results to report concerning phase 1.
As regards phases 2 and 3 one might argue that in phase 3 it had become clear that
Vodafone was the most likely winner of license B, and that the number of incumbents
holding a license would most likely be 4. Perhaps NTL Mobile abandoned bids for
license A in phase 3 because it judged the added advantage of a large license over a
small license to be relatively small in an environment with this sort of competition.
To explain the data, however, the size of this eﬀect must be larger than seems
intuitively plausible.
Shareholders’ Opinion: We consider ﬁrst whether TIW’s bidding in the auction
might have been inﬂuenced by trading in their shares. We focus on trading of TIW
at New York’s NASDAQ stock exchange where TIW is traded as TIWI. Table 7
indicates TIW’s share price at four important moments: before the auction, at the
end of the phase in which TIW had not shown strong interest in a large license
(i.e. on the last trading day before round 106), after round 116 in which TIW bid
for license A and the diﬀerence between license A’s price and the small licenses’
price was maximum among all rounds in which TIW bid for A, and ﬁnally at the
end of the auction. To have a standard of comparison we also list NASDAQ’s
telecommunications index for these dates. TIW is one of the companies included in
this index.19
One might argue that the fact that TIW’s shares lost more than the telecom-
munications index in the ﬁrst phase of the auction triggered a change in TIW’s
bidding strategy. However, as in the case of BT3G, we ﬁnd that the evidence for
this is very weak. The diﬀerence between the performance of TIW’s shares and
the telecommunications index does not appear to be dramatic. On the other hand,
TIW’s aggressive bidding for license A between round 106 and 116 went along with
a very steep decline in TIW’s share price. Yet, even after this period TIW placed
bids for license A. Thus, we conclude that there is no strong evidence in favor of the
19The source for the information in Table 5 is www.nasdaq.com. We indicate daily closing prices.
26claim that TIW’s bidding behaviour was inﬂuenced by the performance of its share
price.
Share price Share price Share price Share price
before round 1 before round 106 after round 116 after ound 150
(3 March) (5 April) (12 April) (27 April)
TIW 239.688 176.25 (-26%) 141.25 (-41%) 146.875 (-39%)
NASDAQ Telecom Index 1178.5 946.44 (-20%) 867.9 (-26%) 792.17 (-33%)
Table 7: TIW’s Share Price (in US Dollars)
We now consider NTL Mobile. This company was jointly owned by NTL and
by France Telecom. The joint ownership makes it less likely that we can ﬁnd direct
relationships between bids and share prices. Nevertheless we brieﬂy consider the
share prices of the companies involved. We indicate in Table 8 the share prices of
NTL as traded on New York’s Stock Exchange (NYSE) and of France Telecom as
traded at the Paris Bourse (now part of the Euronext stock exchange). We indicate
these prices before and after the auction and also for three other important dates:
after round 68 when NTL Mobile abandoned bidding for license A for a while, before
round 100 when NTL Mobile resumed bidding for license A, and again after the end
of round 127 when NTL Mobile abandoned bidding for license A a second time.20
The stock exchange’s response to NTL Mobile’s initial bidding strategy does
not seem to have been particularly negative. Indeed, NTL’s initial performance is
the best among all companies considered in this paper in the comparable period.
Thus, we cannot argue that NTL Mobile’s initial change of strategy would have
been triggered by negative share price developments. Abandoning the large license
seems to have been accompanied by a much larger and sharp fall in share prices. So,
we cannot rule out that NTL Mobile resumed bidding for license A in response to
the large drop in the share prices of its constituent companies. The more aggressive
bidding for license A was accompanied by a large drop in NTL’s shares, but by
a very modest reduction in France Telecom’s shares. It is hard to see in this any
explanation of the fact that NTL Mobile abandoned bidding for license A at the
end of phase 2. We conclude that share price movements might contribute to an
explanation of why NTL Mobile resumed bidding for license A in round 100 but they
d on o th e l pu st ou n d e r s t a n db e t t e rt h eo t h e ra s p e c t so fN T LM o b i l e ’ sb e h a v i o u r .
Share price Share price Share price Share price Share price
before round 1 after round 68 before round 100 after round 127 after found 150
(3 March) (27 March) (4 April) (14 April) (27 April)
NTL 96.06 101 (+5%) 85.56 (-11%) 72.25 (-25%) 74.88 (-22%)
France Telecom 215.5 195.5 (-10%) 162.1 (-25%) 155.0 (-28%) 163.0 (-24%)
Table 8: NTL’s and France Telecom’s Share Prices (in US Dollars and Euros)
20T h es o u r c ef o rN T L ’ ss h a r ep r i c ei sD a t a s t r e a m .T h es o u r c ef o rF r a n c eT e l e c o m ’ ss h a r ep r i c e
is www.euronext.com. We indicate daily closing prices.
27Management Disagreements: Unlike in the case of British Telecom we have no
direct evidence of the possibility of disagreements among the managers considered
in this section. However, the fact that NTL Mobile had two owners, NTL and
France Telecom, may be a signiﬁcant factor. One reason why these owners’ interests
might not have been completely aligned may be that they had diﬀerent plans for the
period after the auction. France Telecom may already have anticipated during the
auction that it might take over a company owning a UK license rather than buying
on itself, whereas NTL may not have had any such plans. A company which was
considering to later buy a successful bidder may have been concerned not to reveal
its evaluation of a license in the auction, unlike a company which did not consider
such a move. The precise way in which such disagreements might have aﬀected
bidding is, however, unclear.
Summary
As in the previous section we ﬁnd little direct evidence for any of the hypotheses
which we consider. However, plausible speculations are that social learning might
explain the gradual rise in NTL Mobile’s bids for license A in the ﬁrst periods of the
auction, and the sudden rise in TIW and NTL Mobile’s bids for license A in phase 2
of the auction. Budget constraints might provide an explanation for NTL Mobile’s
abandonment of license A in phase 3. We have not found any plausible explanation
of why NTL Mobile ceased to bid for license A in phase 1 after round 68.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper, together with its predecessor paper Börgers and Dustmann (2001), pro-
vides a relatively complete analysis of the bids placed in the United Kingdom’s
spectrum auction. Our purpose in conducting this analysis was to establish whether
the bids placed the United Kingdom’s auction can be explained as rational bids for
carefully derived valuations of the licenses, or whether the bids placed in this auction
can only be interpreted as the result of “bidding fever”. We conclude from the data
that it is certainly not trivial to rationalise the bidding behaviour that has been
observed. Where the data could provide hard evidence for some rationalisations,
they refuse to do so. However, there are plausibility considerations which cannot be
directly conﬁrmed or rejected by the data, and which rationalise some of the bids
which we have seen. Further evidence in similar auctions is needed if a better under-
standing of bidder behaviour in license auctions is to be achieved. A well founded
judgement about the reliability of license auctions in achieving eﬃcient allocations
can be formed only once our understanding of bidder behaviour has improved.
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